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SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION AND DEFENDANTS'
RIGHTS*

B. ]. George, Jr.t
DVANCES in science, medicine and industry have made much
of the world a more pleasant place in which to live. In general more men are living a physically more satisfying life in more
comfortable surroundings than preceding generations. But with
this has come a parallel increase in criminality to the point that
the term "crime wave" is heard with increasing frequency. Many
crimes are facilitated in their commission by adaption or application of new scientific discoveries by criminal elements. A natural
consequence is that already overburdened police departments
turn as quickly as is financially possible to new scientific techniques
in an effort to stem the flood. That more suspects are apprehended
as a result cannot be gainsaid.
Experience indicates, however, that almost anyone in a community may be suspected by the police. A great many innocent
persons have their privacy invaded or their liberty curtailed in
the course of police investigation. Constitutional and legal rights
of persons who have committed crimes are often ignored by the
police. These practices have always existed, but the problems have
become more acute through the increased number of techniques
available to the police.
There are of course extra-legal community controls on certain
kinds of police practices.1 Survey techniques may determine the
extent to which communal pressures are effective controls, but
from a lawyer's point of view it is difficult to reduce them to a system. The balance between scientific investigating techniques and

A

•Background paper submitted for the fifth International Congress of Comparative
Law, Brussels, Belgium, August 4-9, 1958.-Ed.
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1 For example, community disapproval of all or some forms of violent or abusive
treatment of arrested or detained persons may today deter their use in a great many
communities. Bad publicity may affect adversely the level of appropriations for police
use. A legislative investigation into police activities, even though no curative legislation
results, often has at least a temporary deterrent effect.
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defendants' rights must be struck in the law courts by rules of law,
and it is with these legal controls that this paper deals.
Direct legal controls on police activities are relatively few in
number. Th.e law of arrest determines when the citizen may be
taken into custody and the maximum permissible time of his
detention.2 No physical abuse is permitted. Officers who transgress
these requirements are subject to civil suit for damages and often
to criminal prosecution. But so long as they stay within these
bounds there is little in the way of direct control over police surveillance and scientific investigation. The main controls have come
into being through indirection. The motivation for much of police
investigation is procurement of evidence which will be adduced
in court to secure a judgment of guilt -against the criminal. Although the statement is often made that anything is available as
evidence unless there is some specific reason why it should not be
admitted,3 the reasons for non-admission are numerous enough
that one may say that each new kind of evidence must make its
own way toward an established position. The obstacles to admissibility are found in the law of evidence, in substantive statute law
and in the constitutions.

Controls Arising From the Law of Evidence
Information derived through scientific police investigation
must for the most part be offered as expert testimony which tends
to establish circumstantially one of the elements necessary to be
proved to sustain the allegations of the indictment or information.4 Before expert testimony may be admitted, it is necessary that
the method used and testified to must be considered scientifically
sound by the court, that the person called to testify be qualified
to use the device or method, that the particular test or investigation
be properly carried out, that possibility of error or substitution be
substantially ruled out and that there be no policy of the law of
evidence which prevents the qualified expert from testifying.

2 A survey of state arrest law is to be found in the Commentary to the American Law
Institute Code of Criminal Procedure, Official Draft, §§1-38 (1930). See also Waite, "Public
Policy and ,the Arrest of Felons," 31 MICH. L. REv. 749 (1933); and Symposium, "Are the
Courts Handcuffing the Police?" 52 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. l (1957).
3 l WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §10 (1940).
4 The defense may of course wish to offer such evidence if favorable to its position.
Most of the cases, however, have arisen from prosecution efforts to submit opinion
evidence based on scientific investigation over defense objection.
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Before test results from a new device can be discussed by an
expert witness, it is necessary that the device or test be accepted
by the courts as scientifically sound enough to merit general
approval of its reliability. Underlying this is the fear that a jury
will accept a scientific device as absolutely reliable, without consideration of any possible percentage of error in its operation
which may have impact on the fact issues which they are to decide. The most striking example of a device which fails to meet
the standard of scientific reliability is the lie detector. Almost
without exception American courts have denied admissibility for
any purpose to testimony about the results of polygraph examination. 5 The operator is not permitted to testify to the conclusions
he reached during his examination of the subject, nor is counsel
permitted to make use of the results indirectly by referring to it
in direct or impeaching examination of a witness.6 But the protection accorded the defendant here is limited to use of evidence
in court.7 The police are not prohibited £:om using the lie detector
as an investigating tool, and if the threat of a lie detector examination or confrontation of a suspect with the unfavorable results of such an examination induces him to confess,8 and no
elements of force, threat or promise make the confession otherwise
coerced and inadmissible,9 it is fully admissible in evidence.
It is also necessary that a witness called to testify about a
scientific test or device be qualified as an expert witness with
reference to the things he testifies about. This is particularly im-

5 The leading case is State v. Bohner, 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.W. 314 (1933). Other
recent cases include State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860 at 884, 46 N.W. (2d) 508 (1950); State
v. Lowrey, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P. (2d) 147 (1947); Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Cr. 45, 230
P. (2d) 495 (1951). The only reported opinion in favor of unrestricted admissibility is
People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S. (2d) 348 (1938), but this is probably overruled
by People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E. (2d) 31 (1938). One court refused to reverse a
criminal conviction when the defendant stipulated admission of lie detector results in
evidence. People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. (2d) 686, 193 P. (2d) 937 (1948). To the contrary
in a civil case, see Stone v. Earp, 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W. (2d) 172 (1951), and in a criminal
case, Le Fevre v. State, 242 Wis. 416, 8 N.W. (2d) 288 (1943).
6A recent example of such indirect use is People v. Aragon, (Cal. App. 1957) 316 P.
(2d) 370.
7 Obviously this doctrine is not for the defendant's benefit, for it rules out lie detector
results favorable to and offered by the defendant. Since the test itself is defective from
a legal point of view, it does not exist as something recognized by the law or evidence.
s Commonwealth v. Jones, 341 Pa. 541, 19 A. (2d) 389 (1941); State v. De Hart, 242
Wis. 562, 8 N.W. (2d) 360 (1943).
9 People v. Sims, 395 Ill. 69, 69 N.E. (2d) 336 (1946), and Bruner v. People, 113 Colo.
194, 156 P. (2d) 111 (1945), are explainable on this ground.
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portant in the first test case of a new scientific device. Failure to
prove adequately the nature of the Harger drunkometer and to
rebut defense testimony about possibilities of error inherent in the
device produced a ruling in Michigan,10 contrary to the rule accepted elsewhere,11 that it was as scientifically unsound as the lie
detector. It is interesting to note that the greatest care is being
exercised in producing expert scientific testimony about the radar
speedmeter in the important test cases now being decided.12 Careful preparation is causing the device to be upheld by the courts.
After a device is accepted as sound, the prosecution case may still
be jeopardized if a poorly qualified person conducts the tests. In
such a case a verdict based on the evidence may be reversed,13 and
there is little question but that the weight of the testimony is
affected adversely by inexperience on the part of the witness. 14
If the test or device is sufficiently sound and the expert witness
properly qualified, the next consideration is whether or not the
test was properly administered in the particular case and the
possibility of substitution or influence by extraneous elements kept
to a minimum. If, for example, the skin area from which a blood
sample was obtained was first swabbed· with alcohol, 15 or the
speed-measuring device used to test the speed of a vehicle driven
by a defendant was not carefully calibrated prior to the time the
reading was taken,16 vigorous cross-examination may weaken or
make inadmissible such evidence. Where comparisons are made of
fingerprints, bullets, weapons, tools, tire marks and other forensic
evidence, the state must account for the custody of both the specimen taken at the scene of the crime and the comparison specimen

10 People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W. (2d)
11 Lombness v. State, 95 Okla. Cr. 214, 243 P.

322 (1949).
(2d) 389 (1952); State v. Olivas, 77
Ariz. 118, 267 P. (2d) 893 (1954); McKay v. State, 155 Tex. Cr. 416, 235 S.W. (2d) 173
(1951); People v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill. App. 504, 99 N.E. (2d) 567 (1951); Commonwealth v.
Hartman, 383 Pa. 461, 119 A. (2d) 211 (1956).
12 State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115 A. (2d) 35 (1955); State v. Moffitt, 48 Del. 210,
100 A. (2d) 778 (1953). Lack of such expert testimony was fatal in People v. Torpey, 204
Misc. 1023, 128 N.Y.S. (2d) 864 (1953).
13 Hill v. State, 158 Tex. Cr. 313, 256 S.W. (2d) 93 (1953); Riddle v. State, (Okla.
Cr. 1955) 288 P. (2d) 761.
14 Omohundro v. Arlington County, 194 Va. 773, 75 S.E. (2d) 496 (1953).
15 Cf. People v. Modell, 143 Cal. App. (2d) 724, 300 P. (2d) 204 (1956), and Pribyl
v. State, (Neb. 1957) 87 N.W. (2d) 201. For similar procedural errors in using the drunkometer, see State v. Hunter, 4 N.J. Super. 531, 68 A. (2d) 274 (1949), and Hill v. State,
158 Tex. Cr. 313, 256 S.W. (2d) 93 (1953).
16 Cf. State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570, 115 A. (2d) 35 (1955), and People v. Sarver, 205
Misc. 523, 129 N.Y.S. (2d) 9 (1954).
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from the time of procurement to the time of trial, in order to ensure against mistake or substitution.17 If the chain of custody is
broken the evidence will be ruled inadmissible. Although comparatively few cases apply these rules, knowledge that a careful
defense attorney may secure rejection of scientific evidence in
this way keeps police alert and careful in their procurement and
retention of material for scientific comparison and testing.
Sometimes otherwise competent evidence must be rejected because of some overriding policy of evidence law. Most often this
policy is embodied in the form of a privilege which protects a
right of privacy. The only privilege likely to be encountered in
the area of scientific investigation is the statutory physician-patient
privilege, which permits a patient to stop the mouth of a physician
retained to treat or prescribe for him concerning what was determined or said in the course of examination.18 Tests for intoxication are sometimes required to be administered by a licensed
physician,19 and even in the absence of such a requirement they
very commonly are so administered. On occasion, defendants have
objected to testimony by the testing physician on the ground of
privilege. In order to establish a claim of privilege it is necessary
to show that the physician was retained for the purpose of diagnosing and treating the claimant. If examination is at the instance
of the prosecution, such a relationship does not exist.2 ° Furthermore, the relationship must be confidential. If persons are pres-

17 State v. Willis, 37 Wash. (2d) 274, 223 P. (2d) 453 (1950); People v. Sansalone, 208
Misc. 491, 146 N.Y.S. (2d) 359 (1955); People v. Reenstierna, (N.H. 1958) 140 A. (2d) 572.
18 The most complete discussion of this privilege is found in 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,
3d ed., §§2380-2391 (1940). On rare occasions the common law attorney-client privilege
may apply. See 8 W1GMORE §§2290-2329. Results and reports of scientific experiments
carried out at an attorney's request during preparation of the case are privileged, though
the privilege does not extend to testimony by the experts who made the experiments;
some other privilege must be found if they are to be kept from testifying. If officers
impersonate an attorney in order to gain some advantage over a defendant, the lawyerclient privilege may be invoked to silence them. Cf. People v. Barker, 60 Mich. 277,
27 N.W. 539 (1886). Eavesdropping, however, is usually held to destroy the confidentiality
required by the privilege, so that, for example, wiretapping or the use of a detectaphone
does not violate the privilege, though they possibly violate other rules discussed later.
Cf. Cal. Penal Code (Deering, Supp. 1957) §653i, which makes it a felony to eavesdrop
on confidential communications.
19 Idaho Code (1957) §49-354; Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1957) §8-1003; N.Y. Vehicle
and Traffic Law (McKinney, Supp. 1958) §71-a; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1957) §483.630; Utah
Code Ann. (Supp. 1957) §41-6-44.10; Va. Code (Supp. 1958) §18.75.1.
20 Richter v. Hoglund, (7th Cir. 1943) 132 F. (2d) 748; Hanlon v. Woodhouse, 113
Colo. 504, 160 P. (2d) 998 (1945); Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36, 240 P. (2d) 512 (1952).
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ent other than to assist the doctor, the testimony is not privileged.21
Further, the particular statement made or test carried through
must be necessary to enable the doctor to diagnose and treat. Tests
for intoxication are often, though logically not inevitably, considered unnecessary for treatment, and are therefore held to be
unprivileged.22 Relatively few cases result in actual application
of the privilege. Desire for certainty, however, probably causes
metropolitan police departments to use a small core of trained
doctors to administer such tests, which in turn tends to guarantee
to a defendant that the tests at least will be safely administered by
experts even though he cannot claim privilege to prevent them
from testifying.

Controls Created by Legislation
On occasion statutes may create additional obstacles to the
use of scientific evidence, either in court or absolutely. Sometimes
legislation extends the general coverage of a principle of evidence
law, with the incidental result of restricting the use of certain
kinds of scientific evidence. Thus, for example, the creation by
statute of the physician-patient privilege, by analogy to the common law attorney-client privilege, was not done with any thought
of affecting the use of scientific evidence procured by a doctor.23
But since the statutory language covers such a situation, it has
been necessary for the courts to resolve the question of how far
it in fact applies to such tests.
Other statutes deal specifically with the conditions under which
certain scientific tests must be carried out. For example, several
states require that blood tests for intoxication be carried out only
by a physician.24 Presumably results of a blood test carried out by
a non-physician are inadmissible. Or inquiries into the sanity or
mental condition of an individual may have to be carried out by

21 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2381 (1940). Thus if police officers are present, the
privilege probably does not attach. Iwerks v. People, 108 Colo. 556, 120 P. (2d) 961 (1942).
22 Perry v. Hannagan, 257 Mich. 120, 241 N.W. 232 (1932); State v. Townsend, 146
Kan. 982, 73 P. (2d) 1124 (1937). Statutory language may dictate a contrary conclusion
however. Okla. Stat. Ann. (1937) tit. 12, §385; Clapp v. State, 73 Okla. Cr. 261, 120 P.
(2d) 381 (1941).
23 Rather, the purpose was to encourage full disclosure by the patient of everything
necessary to enable the doctor to treat the case. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§2380,
2380-a (1940).
24 See the statutes in note 19 supra.
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certain specified officials or by persons possessing certain professional qualifications.25
The maximum control is of course by legislation which prohibits the use of a particular scientific device otherwise acceptable
under the law of evidence.26 The most striking example is the
legislative treatment of wiretapping. Prior to 1934 there was nothing inherently wrong in the use of wiretaps so long as they were
not placed physically on premises owned or in the possession of
the defendant.27 But in 1934 Congress enacted section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act28 which provides in part:
" ... [A]nd no person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning
of such intercepted communication to any person...."
Although there was no clear indication that wiretapping by police
was considered by Congress at the time the statute was enacted29
and although exceptions have been created by judicial interpretation of other regulatory statutes, absolute on their face, in favor
of police and other governmental officials in the performance of
their official duties, 30 the United States Supreme Court held that
taps placed by government agents were without authorization by
the sender and that testimony by the officers about what they
overheard would constitute divulgence within the meaning of
the statute. Consequently, in order not to connive at the com-

25 E.g., 18 U.S.C. (1952) §4241: "A board of examiners for each Federal penal and
correctional institution shall consist of (1) a medical officer appointed by the warden or
superintendent of the institution; (2) a medical officer appointed by the Attorney General;
and (3) a competent expert in mental diseases appointed by the Surgeon General of the
United States Public Health Service." 18 U.S.C. (1952) §4244: " .•• [T]he court shall
cause the accused, whether or not previously admitted to bail, to be examined as to his
mental condition by at least one qualified psychiatrist, who shall report to the court...."
26 Legislation is also possible which permits the use of otherwise inadmissible evidence,
but it is difficult to find legislation which goes this far, as opposed to that which liberalizes
the conditions under which basically acceptable evidence is to be received. Compare the
amendment of the Michigan Constitution (1908), Art. II, §10, to permit introduction into
evidence of narcotics, firearms and explosives earlier proscribed under the Michigan
interpretation of the search and seizure provision.
27 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). If a trespass was involved the Fourth
Amendment search and seizure exclusionary rule, discussed below, was invoked.
28 48 Stat. 1103-1104 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1952) §605.
29 The Government so argued in Nardone v. United States (First Nardone Case),
302 U.S. 379 (1937). See also -Rosenzweig, "The Law of Wiretapping,'' 32 CoRN. L. Q. 514
at 532-535 (1947).
so E.g., speed laws. State v. Gorham, 110 Wash. 330, 188 P. 457 (1920).
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mission of a crime in the courtroom, evidence based on wiretapping was declared illegal and inadmissible. 31 On the face of it this
would not have prevented use of wiretapping as a surveillance
device so long as.a transcript of the overheard conversations was
not offered in evidence. But soon afterward the Supreme Court
held that all evidence derived from illegal wiretaps was equally
inadmissible as "fruit of the poison tree," 32 which in effect makes
wiretapping useless if a federal court case is to be built up around
the information secured.33
Prior to 1934 wiretap evidence was generally admissible in
state courts. At least there was no indication on the part of state
appellate courts that such testimony would be improper.84 Since
the enactment and interpretation of the federal statute, state
reaction has varied. A number of states have done nothing. 35 A
few states prohibit wiretapping and wiretap evidence in their
courts.36 At least two states specifically provide for the placing
of wiretaps pursuant to ex parte court order. 37 The question naturally arose as .to the admissibility of such evidence in state
courts and the validity of state legislation which regulated or permitted wiretapping. The first question was answered by Schwartz v.
T exas,3 8 in which state officers had placed taps and had been permitted to testify in a state criminal prosecution abqut what they

31 Nardone v. United States, (First Nardone Case), 302 U.S. 379 (1937). Intrastate calls
are also covered. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939). Monitoring of radio messages
is also covered. United States v. Sugden, (9th Cir. 1955) 226 F. (2d) 281, affd. per curiam
351 U.S. 916 (1956).
82Nardone v. United States (Second Nardone Case), 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
33 A good example is United States v. Coplon, (S.D. N.Y. 1950) 88 F. Supp. 921;
(2d Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 629. Use of transcripts to induce a person to become a government witness is, however, unobjectionable. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
34 Rosenzweig, "The Law of Wiretapping," 33 CoRN. L. Q. 73-80 (1947).
85 E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§750.539, 750.540. For typical state cases, see Leon
v. State, 180 Md. 279, 23 A. (2d) 706 (1942); People v. Sica, 112 Cal. App. (2d) 574, 247
P. (2d) 72 (1952); but cf. People v. Kelley, 22 Cal. (2d) 169, 137 P. (2d) 1 (1943); State v.
Steadman, 216 S.C. 579, 59 S.E. (2d) 168 (1950).
86 R. I. Gen. Laws (1956) §§11-35-12, 13; Ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1957)
tit. 38, §§206.1 to 206.5. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. (Vernon, 1941) art. 727a, bars all
illegally-obtained evidence.
37 N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. (McKinney, 1958) §813-a; N.Y. CONST., Art I, §12. Ore. Rev.
Stat. (1957) §§141.720 to 141.740. Evidence from any tap is admissible in criminal cases,
Harlem Check Cashing Corp. v. Bell, 296 N.Y. 15, 68 N.E. (2d) 854 (1946); though not
in civil cases, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §345-a. Oregon ,bars all such evidence. Ore. Rev. Stat.
(1957) §41.910. Officers in both states who place taps without a court order commit a
felony. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. (McKinney, 1958) §813-b; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1957) §165.540.
38 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
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overheard. Although the Supreme Court recognized that the officers had violated the federal statute, it held that the rule of exclusion in federal courts is based on the Court's control over
the federal judicial process. Lacking such power constitutionally to
control state court practice, the exclusionary rule could not be
applied to prohibit the use of wiretap evidence in a state court.
This left untouched the question of the validity of state legislation regulating or prohibiting wiretapping. Disturbing questions about this point have been raised by the recent case of
Benanti v. United States. 89 New York police officers had procured
a court order40 authorizing them to tap Benanti's telephone and
had overheard incriminating conversations. No federal officers
participated in the tapping in any way. The state officers were
called to testify in a federal prosecution against Benanti based
in part on the statements overheard. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, citing the basic proposition of the First
Nardone Case that divulgence in court constitutes a violation of
section 605. The Government, however, argued that the taps were
placed properly under New York law, and that there was room for
state regulation of wiretapping which should be recognized by
the Court. But the Court held that state authorization must be held
ineffectual, in that Congress had occupied the field to the exclusion
of state power. The implication is that any state regulation, whether legalizing or prohibiting wiretapping, is unconstitutional as
invading an area preempted by Congress under one of the delegated powers.41 But Schwartz v. Texas remains undisturbed, 42
which suggests the incongruous result that evidence obtained illegally in a ~tate which does not exclude it on that ground alone is
in a more favored position than evidence admitted or rejected pursuant to state statute. How, if at all, this will be resolved is uncertain, but in the meantime wiretapping must be considered a surveillance technique fraught with danger to the prosecution if
criminal charges arising from or to be proved even in part or in-

39 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
40 Under the statute cited in note 37 supra.
41 The Court cited Pennsylvania v. Nelson,

350 U.S. 497 (1956), which voided state
subversive control legislation consistent with federal legislation, Hill v. Florida ex rel.
Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945), which held a state law for licensing of business agents and
registration of unions incompatible with the National Labor Relations Act, and Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), which struck down a state alien registration law.
~ Footnote 19 of the opinion so indicates. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 at
106 (1957).
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directly by the overheard conversations are m any way contemplated.
Wiretapping does not include within it all types of electronic
or mechanical eavesdropping by police. Only the electronic circuit is protected by the federal statute. It is therefore unobjectionable to use a detectaphone or other device which picks up sound
waves mechanically,43 so long as the device is not placed on premises
of the defendant. Listening or recording from one end of the line,
at least with authorization of one of the parties to the conversation, does not violate section 605.44 And there is no objection to
using a small portable transmitter for the purpose of transmitting
conversation with a suspect to officers holding a receiver, so long
as the defendant's property is not trespassed upon.45 The same
thing holds true for long-range observation by searchlight, binoculars or ca~era.46

Control by Constitutional Provisions
The Constitution of the United States and the constitutions
of most of the states contain a number of procedural guarantees to
criminal defendants. The three which have the greatest potential
effect on the use of scientific evidence are the search and seizure
provision, the privilege against self-incrimination and the due
process clause.
Unreasonable Search and Seizure. The constitutions generally protect persons against unreasonable searches and seizures.47
Search warrants may issue only upon probable cause supported
by oath describing particularly the person or thing to be seized
and the premises to be searched. Any search and seizure carried
through under an invalid search warrant or improperly under
a valid search warrant are unconstitutional. The more actively
litigated question, however, is what constitutes an unreasonable
search. Arrests without warrant have been legally possible since
before the adoption of the several constitutional provisions, and
at least some search incident to a valid arrest is also legally

43 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
44 Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
45 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
46 United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
47 U.S. CONST., Amend. IV, sets the pattern.
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permissible.48 If, however, a person is detained improperly, the
seizure of his person, the ensuing search, and the seizure of
articles to be used in evidence are all unreasonable and therefore
unconstitutional.49 If the arrest is valid, but the search extends
beyond the person or immediate presence of the arrested person,
the search and the seizure are unreasonable and ~nconstitutional.50
One may say, therefore, that constitutional searches are limited
to cases of legal arrest with or without warrant in which only
the person of, things carried by, and room occupied at the time
of arrest by the arrested person are searched. 51
The constitutional provisions contain no remedy for violations. Prior to 1914 redress for unconstitutional conduct had to be
sought in the form of civil actions against or prosecution of the
offending officers. But in 1914 the United States Supreme Court
decided that the traditional forms of relief were inadequate. Since
unconstitutional police conduct is most often motivated by the
desire to procure evidence upon which to secure a conviction of
crime, the Court reasoned that if the motivation was removed
the practices would diminish or cease entirely. Therefore, the
Court ruled that evidence obtained through an unconstitutional
search and seizure is thereby inadmissible as evidence in any
federal court.52 Several of the states immediately followed the
lead of the United States Supreme Court in the interpretation of
their own state constitutional provisions,53 and in recent years
an additional number of states have made a similar change.54 The
exclusionary rule, however, is a rule of evidence adopted in the
exercise of the power to control procedure and practice, so that
it cannot be called a requirement of due process of law binding on
the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.55
48 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
49 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
50 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
51 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
52 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
53 The state of law in each state prior to 1949 is summarized

in the Appendix to
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
54 The most striking change was in California, rwhere People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. (2d)
434, 282 P. (2d) 905 (1955), reversed a long line of cases rejecting the exclusionary rule.
The same thing occurred earlier in Delaware. Rickards v. State, 45 Del. 573, 77 A. (2d)
199 (1950). Three states have adopted the rule by statute. N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953) §15-27;
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. (Vernon, 1941) Art. 727a; R.I. Gen. Laws (1956) §9-19-25. Maryland
has adopted the rule for misdemeanor cases, with several qualifications discussed in
Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954).
55 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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In jurisdictions, therefore, having the exclusionary rule, any
evidence, including scientific, obtained in violation of a defendant's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is
inadmissible. Thus, comparison of handwriting specimens and ballistics tests are clearly proper under the law of evidence. But if
one.of the comparison specimens is obtained while the defendant
is improperly under arrest or by an illegal search of his house, it
becomes inadmissible56 and the expert's testimony becomes impossible for want of things in evidence to compare. Blood tests
for intoxication are scientifically valid, but if a sample is taken
without consent from a person under illegal detention, evidence
about the illegally-obtained sample will be unavailable in court. 57
Use of a detectaphone does not violate the Federal Communications Act, but if it is placed on the defendant's premises by an act
of trespass, the results obtained by its use are unavailable to the
prosecution. 58 Thus all kinds of evidence, scientific and otherwise,
are controlled by the exclusionary rule. Conversely, if a state does
not have the exclusionary rule, police are not hampered by any
restriction on admissibility of evidence not found in the law of
evidence or by virtue of a special statute. 59
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination. The law of every state
contains the equivalent to the language of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ."
In most states the privilege, in line with its historical development,
applies only to "testimonial utterances" compelled in some kind of
formal proceeding. 00 Nevertheless, some jurisdictions have read
into the privilege the concept that no person shall be the unwilling
~ource of evidence against himself. Though the position is seldom
consistently maintained, some courts have excluded evidence of
physical examinations, 61 blood specimens62 and the like. Others
have interpreted the privilege to prohibit affirmative acts from

United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
United States v. Willis, (S.D. Cal. 1949) 85 F. Supp. 745; State v. Weltha, 228 Iowa
519, 292 N.W. 148 (1940) (semble).
58 Cf. the discussion in Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438 (1928).
59 State v. Alexander, 7 N.J. 585, 83 A. (2d) 441 (1951).
60 The cases are gathered in 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2265 (1940).
61State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902); State v. Newcomb, 220 Mo.
54, 119 s.w. 405 (1909).
62 Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Cr. 593, 146 S.W. (2d) 381 (1940); People v. Dennis,
131 Misc. 62, 226 N.Y.S. 689 (1928).
56
57
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being required of a suspect, but not to protect his person from being the passive source of evidence. Thus to be required to make
tracks for comparison is in violation of the privilege, but to have
one's shoes removed forcibly is not. 63 In most states, however, privilege poses no problem in the acquisition of material on which
scientific tests are to be made.
Conceptually, however, a more serious problem is presented
when a defendant is required to write handwriting specimens for
comparison, or required to answer questions during an examination to determine mental condition at the time of a criminal act.
In both instances a defendant is required to make utterances which
may result in evidence against him. However, against application
of the privilege it may be argued either that the defendant has
in fact an option to refuse to write or speak, so that if he does so
his privilege is waived, or that the statements he makes are not
in fact to be used as evidence against him, but rather serve as
raw data for determination of a fact not actually referred to in
the substance of the statements stemming from defendant. Whatever the reason, courts have generally upheld the procurement of
such evidence as not violative of the privilege. 64
Any constitutional guarant~e for the protection of a defendant
can be waived. One of the more interesting recent legislative
developments is that of compulsory waiver of privilege in cases
arising out of use of the highways. Use of the highways is a privilege afforded to and not a right of the citizen. 65 Several states
have enacted that any person who holds an operator's permit is
deemed to have consented to the taking of any blood, urine or
breath specimen whenever there is reason to believe he is intoxicated. 66 Refusal in fact to consent is ground for revocation of
the permit after hearing. The device has been held constitutional, 67

63 State v. Griffin, 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81 (1924); Aiken v. State, 16 Ga. App. 848,
86 S.E. 1076 (1913).
64 Beltran v. Samson and Jose, 53 Phil. Is. 570 (1929); Clark v. United States, (5th
Cir. 1923) 293 F. 301; State v. Barnard, 176 Minn. 349, 223 N.W. 452 (1929).
65 People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y. 115, 102 N.E. 530 (1913); Larr v. Dignan, 317
Mich. 121, 26 N.W. (2d) 872 (1947); Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 (1903).
66 Kan. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1957) §8-1001; N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law (McKinney,
Supp. 1958) §71-a; Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1957) §41-6-44.10. Other states require actual
consent. Ore. Rev. Stat. (1957) §483.630; Va. Code (Supp. 1958) §18.75.1.
67 At least if the arrest is legally proper, and proper hearing is given before license
revocation. Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S. (2d) 257 (1955); People v.
Kovacik, 205 Misc. 275, 128 N.Y.S. (2d) 492 (1954).
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and thus ensures that police authorities will have free access to the
best kind of evidence of intoxication, provided they comply with
the statutory requirements as to the method of procuring test
samples.
Due Process of Law. Under federal and state constitutions "no
person . . . shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." 68 The impact of the clause on criminal procedure in general is great, and it serves as the chief medium of
control of state procedure by the federal courts. It applies, however, to use of scientific investigatory devices in two primary
areas.
One arises out of the doctrine which holds use of a coerced
confession in a criminal case to be a denial of due process. 69 Police
brutality and the use of psychic pressures to procure confessions
can of course scarcely be called "scientific" techniques of investigation. But the use of hypnosis and narcosis is on occasion relied
on to obtain a statement from one suspected of having committed
a crime. Where confessions have been so obtained they have
been to date struck down as coerced and held inadmissible under
the due process clause.70 If, however, a psychiatrist or psychologist
examining a person to determine his mental condition uses either
technique, he may testify to the conclusions he reached about the
subject's condition.71 Thus the technique is scientifically sound
enough to support a professional conclusion, at least for ancillary
use, but is deemed untrustworthy when used to elicit a confession
for police use, and serves to violate due process of law requirements as well.
The second covers extraction of evidence from the person by
violent methods. In Rochin v. California12 the Supreme Court was
confronted by a case in which state officers had pumped the stom-

68 U.S. CONST., Amend. V (binding on federal authorities) and Amend. XIV (binding
on states). The former sets the pattern for state constitutional equivalents.
69 Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936);
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
70 Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Lindsey v. United States, (9th Cir. 1956) 237
F. (2d) 893; State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 257, 243 P. (2d) 325 (1952); People v. Leyra,
302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E. (2d) 553 (1951); State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860, 46 N.W. (2d) 508 (1950).
71 People v. Esposito, 287 N.Y. 389, 39 N.E. (2d) 925 (1942), but cf. People v. Ford,
304 ,N.Y. 679, 107 N.E. (2d) 595 (1952). The former involved testimony on the ancillary
question of whether or not defendants were sane enough to stand trial. The latter case
rejected such testimony submitted on the question of insanity at the time of the criminal
act charged. Cf. People v. Speaks, (Cal. App. 1958) 319 P. (2d) 709.
12 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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ach of a person, suspected of possessing narcotics, who was seen to
swallow something immediately before he was illegally arrested.
California did not then have the exclusionary rule, so that evidence
of the narcotic content of the stomach was used to convict him of
a violation of state law. The Supreme Court did not see fit to
reverse its earlier position that Fourteenth Amendment due process does not require the states to adopt the exclusionary rule in
cases where unreasonable search and seizure had been carried
through. 73 Rather, it held that evidence obtained through physical violence which shocks the conscience, which results from
"methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation," 74 violates due process of law if admitted
in a criminal case. How far the doctrine goes to prohibit nonconsensual acquisition of evidence from the person of a suspect
remains to be seen.75 It was specifically held not to apply to the
taking of blood, breath and urine specimens to determine intoxication.76 Two intermediate courts of appeal have held it inapplicable to rectal examination which revealed narcotics in suppositories. 77 To how many kinds of unpleasant physical examination the Rochin rule will be held applicable, particularly after
the Breithaupt case, is uncertain, but that it serves as a potential
check to calloused or dangerous examination at the hands of
police ought not be minimized.78

73 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
74 342 U.S. 165 at 172 (1952).
75 It does not cover invasion of a defendant's

home as opposed to his person. Irvine
v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), in which officers placed concealed microphones and
recording equipment throughout the defendant's home.
76 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). The four dissenting justices felt that
this left no real room for the Rochin rule to operate. It is difficult to see how United
States v. Townsend, (D.C. D.C. 1957) 151 F. Supp. 378, which excluded results of blood
tests based on swabbings from a rape suspect's genitals, can be reconciled with Breithaupt
v.Abram.
77 Blackford v. United States, (9th Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 745; Application of Woods,
(D.C. Cal. 1957) 154 F. Supp. 932; People v. Woods, 139 Cal. App. (2d) 515, 293 P. (2d)
901 (1956). In both instances the defendants were under lawful arrest and external
physical examination indicated clearly that something had been inserted through the
anus. See also State v. Pierce, (Vt. 1958) 141 A. (2d) 419.
78 "This is not to say that the indiscriminate taking of blood under different conditions or by those not competent to do so may not amount to such 'brutality' as would
come under the Rochin rule. The chief law-enforcement officer of New Mexico, while
at the Bar of this Court, assured us that every proper medical precaution is afforded an
accused from whom blood is taken." 352 U.S. at 437-438. The California court relied on
Rochin in part in People v. Speaks, (Cal. App. 1958) 319 P. (2d) 709.
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Conclusion
Methods of obtaining are of considerable importance in determining admissibility of evidence, the scientific reliability of which
has been otherwise established. The status of the several kinds
of investigative techniques may be summarized as follows:
Scientific Interrogation. Though most experts feel the polygraph to be reliable, 79 the courts have not felt that it is. With the
possible exception of a case in which both sides stipulate for their
use, so polygraph test results cannot be used or referred to in any
way. Hypnosis anp. narcosis, however, are recognized at least indirectly as scientifically sound methods of determining mental
condition, where an expert opinion is to be expressed. If, however,
statements admitting guilt are so .procured, they are likely to be
deemed coerced in violation of the due process clauses. Should any
or all of the three methods come to be recognized as proper in
securing statements, a possible question of the privilege against
self-incrimination arises.81 Results of such interrogation by federal
officers during illegal custody of an arrested person may also fall
afoul of the evidentiary exclusion rule arising from the prompt production provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.82
Physiological Examination. The scientific accuracy of tests,
chemical and mechanical, of body tissues, fluids, breath and the
like is unimpeachable. If, however, samples are obtained in the
course of an unlawful arrest, the subject's constitutional rights
have been violated, and if the jurisdiction pursuant to whose
authority the investigating officers purport to act has in force the
exclusionary rule, results of the tests performed on the sample are

79 For a dissent on this proposition, see Levitt, "Scientific Evaluation of the 'Lie
Detector,'" 40 IowA L. REv. 440 (1955).
80 People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. (2d) 686, 193 P. (2d) 937-(1948).
81 However, the answers are not being required by a regular constituted hearing
body, answers must be voluntarily given so that the waiver doctrine applies, and the
important thing in any event is not the answers which the subject gives, but rather
the physiological or mental condition which accompanies the words. Statements showing
guilt elicited under narcosis or 'hypnosis required by court order might well be held
within the privilege unless the waiver doctrine were invoked.
82 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. (1952) rule 5(a) requires an arrested
person to ,be taken before a United States commissioner "without unnecessary delay." To
discourage federal officers from violating this requirement, the Supreme Court has ruled
out all statements taken from a person in unlawful detention in violation of the rule,
without regard to their voluntary character. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
The method used in obtaining the statement should be immaterial if the test is unlawful
detention at the time.
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inadmissible as evidence. In the remaining jurisdictions such evidence is fully admissible regardless of the circumstances under
which it was obtained. Occasionally the privilege against selfincrimination may be invoked to prevent use of specimens taken
without consent from a subject under either lawful or illegal
detention, although the number of jurisdictions in which this is
possible is small. If, however, undue violence or crudity is used
in procuring such evidence, the rule of the Rochin case may be
invoked in either state or federal courts.
Forensic Evidence. The accuracy of ballistics tests and of comparison tests between hand·writing and typewriting specimens,
fingerprints, tire marks, footprints, tool marks, hairs, fingernail
parings, fibers, fabrics, dust and dirt samples, vegetable matter and
the like is well enough established that expert testimony about
them is everywhere admissible, provided the particular tests have
been accurately made and possibility of substitution of samples
guarded against.83 Comparison specimens obtained in the course
of an unreasonable search and seizure may not be discussed in
evidence in jurisdictions following the federal exclusionary rule.
Arguments based on the privilege against self-incrimination are
rarely accepted, and the rule of the Rochin case seems inapplicable.
Electronic Surveillance. Wiretapping, radio monitoring, use of
portable transmitters, and the radar speedmeter are all scientifically exact enough to be recognized judicially. If, however, such
devices are used during the course of a trespass on the defendant's
property, the results will be inadmissible by the exclusionary rule
of unreasonable search and seizure. And the Federal Communications Act, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court,
limits use of wiretap evidence only to those state courts willing or
able under state law to receive evidence from any source whatever.
One may, of course, argue that whatever is potentially relevant
to resolution of any fact issue in a criminal case should be received
by a court. One certainly has excellent historical and policy reasons
for questioning any application whatever of the privilege against
self-incrimination to non-verbal evidence from a defendant. In
particular one may quarrel with the exclusionary rule which usually results in emasculating the case against a man who has committed a crime because police officers have themselves committed
83 The latter requirement applies also to specimens procured through physiological
examination.

54

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

unlawful acts, thus in effect benefitting the guilty and not the
innocent who are relegated to civil action or criminal prosecution
of the officers involved.84 Such arguments, however, are beside the
point if one considers the question of the status of scientific investigation today. Defendants do have statutory and constitutional
rights, and exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of such
rights is recognized to such an extent that one must conclude that
pursuit of scientific truth without regard for human rights and
sensibilities is, and probably should be, a matter for the laboratory
and not the courtroom.

84 See

Waite, "Judges and the Crime Burden," 54
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